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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred statutorily by 
Section 77-18a-l, et seq., U.C.A., (1953) as amended, allowing an 
appeal of right from the final judgment of conviction, whether by 
plea or verdict. Appeal was taken herein by filing a Notice of 
Appeal with the clerk of the Seventh Judicial District Court, in 
and for the County of Carbon, State of Utah, from which the 
appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The United States Constitution, Amendment 4, and the State 
of Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14 prohibit unreasonable 
searches and seizures even of parolees. By allowing officers, 
whether probation and parole or otherwise, to search the vehicle 
and premise without a warrant, these constitutional protections 
were violated and the trial court should have suppressed the 
evidence gathered during the unlawful search and the verdict 
should be overturned. This is a determination of law, wherein a 
factual setting was applied to legal principals. The appellate 
Court should apply a nondeferential review for correction. 
The use of Adult Probation and Parole officers to perform 
warrantless searches was done with the express intent of 
circumventing the Fourth Amendment and Section Fourteen privacy 
rights. Therefore, any evidence gathered pursuant to such arrest 
should have been suppressed, and the verdict should be 
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Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon County, State 
of Utah and from a ruling on a Motion to Suppress, held 
immediately prior to the jury trial herein, wherein the Honorable 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday, denied Defendant's Motion to suppress 
certain evidence. Defendant claimed the evidence was gathered 
illegally, and in violation of constitutional protections. The 
trial court did not issue separate findings of fact or 
conclusions of law on its ruling on Defendant's Motion. The 
Motion is attached in the addenda. 
Defendant was convicted by the jury of all counts contained 
in the information, a copy of which is attached hereto within the 
addenda. Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of one (1) to 
fifteen (15) years on Count I of the information against him; and 
one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Counts II, III, IV, V, for each 
count, and for each term to run concurrently with each other but 
consecutive to the term for Count I; and one (1) year on County 
VI, to run concurrently with the term for Count I; and one (1) to 
fifteen (15) years on Count VII, to run consecutively with the 
terms for Counts II, III, IV, and V. A copy of the sentence and 
commitment is attached in the addenda. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A seven (7) count information against the Defendant was 
filed in this matter on or about the 28th day of March, 1994, by 
the Carbon County Attorney. A preliminary hearing was held on or 
about the 5th day of April, 1994. At the preliminary hearing the 
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contacted by a female driver who informed him that she had 
followed a brown vehicle, with license no. 583 FAB, containing 
three Hispanic males, from Wellington to Price and that the 
vehicle was driving erratically. This driver informed the 
officer that the vehicle exited from SR-6 and travelled into 
Price, then turned into the local Ace Lumber Yard. 
Officer Mele steered his patrol vehicle to the Ace Lumber 
Yard. He did not encounter the ATL vehicle there, and proceeded 
into the Melody Estates Trailer Park, adjacent to the Ace Lumber 
Yard. Cruising through the trailer park, Officer Mele observed 
what he believed was the ATL vehicle, bearing license plate no. 
581 FAB, parked at Trailer No. 41. Officer Mele knew that 
trailer 41 belonged to Teddy Kinneman. He parked his vehicle 
immediately behind the brown Ford and radioed for back up on the 
police radio. Officer Mele exited his own vehicle and knocked on 
the door of Trailer No. 41. After 30 seconds the door opened and 
a "Hispanic looking male" presented himself, shutting the door 
behind him. Back up arrived about this time, and two other law 
enforcement officers, began looking at the ATL vehicle, which by 
this time had been identified as belonging to a third party, not 
the "Hispanic looking male." 
In the vehicle were two rifles. The officers present told 
the "Hispanic-looking male", identified as Matthew Thomas 
Roberts, that they were going to open the vehicle to retrieve the 
firearms in an effort to maintain public safety. The officers 
retrieved the firearms, and, after being run on the National 
5 
Crime Information Computer (NCIC) and showing clean, were placed 
in the trunk of one of the law enforcement officer's vehicles for 
"safe keeping." In the meantime, the "Hispanic-looking male" had 
been placed under arrest for having been a restricted person in 
possession of a firearm. At this time, having been told by the 
arrested man that no-one else was in the trailer, but hearing 
noises from within, the law enforcement officers requested that 
Adult Probation and Parole Officers come to Trailer No. 41 to 
look for criminals. 
The AP&P officers entered the dwelling and therein 
encountered two other persons, one by the name of John Daniel 
Pimental, and the other the Appellant, Amorico Archuletta. 
Pimental and Archuletta were both immediately handcuffed and 
escorted to patrol vehicles. Archuletta was then transported to 
the Carbon County Jail. Pimental was set free. 
The officers then proceeded to search the vehicle. The 
officers determined that they would search without a warrant 
because of the status of Roberts as a parolee. During their 
search, the officers recovered miscellaneous items including a 
briefcase, a camera, some clothing items, reloaded rifle 
cartridges, and a small change bank. The officer's then opened 
the brief case and read the papers inside. Some papers had the 
name and address of Veloy Sorensen of 550 Edgehill in Sunnyside, 
Utah. The officers contacted other law officers from East 
Carbon, a community near Sunnyside, and requested that they check 
out this address. The East Carbon officers determined from their 
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inspection of the property that it had been forcibly entered. 
Archuletta was arrested for trespassing, and later charged with 
the offenses of which he was convicted in the trial in this 
matter. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
(A) Whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress 
evidence gathered from the vehicle without a search warrant, when 
those officers knew the vehicle was owned by a third party and 
when there were no exigent circumstances. 
(B) Whether the use of Adult Probation and Parole Officers 
by Price City Police Officers was done with an intent to, and the 
effect of, circumventing U.S. Constitution 4th Amendment 
protection and State of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
protection. 
(C) Whether the trial court erred by failing to dismiss 
counts three through six of the Information against Archuletta 
because the charges each arose out of the same criminal conduct, 
with the same elements being supplied by the same conduct of the 
defendant. 
(D) Whether the evidence presented at trial supported the 
conviction of the Defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence was not granted 
by the Trial Court. The Defendant argues that the Trial Court 
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erred by failing to suppress evidence gathered during that search 
because the search performed on the vehicle involved in this 
matter was done without the benefit of a warrant and that a 
warrant should have been obtained prior to any search. Defendant 
argues that there existed no exigent circumstances, that the 
vehicle belonged to a third party, not present at the time of the 
search, and no proper permission was given for the search that 
was performed and the initial search was performed prior to the 
arrival of any AP&P officers. The Defendant argues that the law 
enforcement officers collaborated with officers from Adult 
Probation and Parole because they either couldn't obtain a search 
warrant or didn't desire to expend the energy to do so. While 
acknowledging that there are some limitations placed on the 4th 
Amendment rights and Article I Section 14 rights on a parolee, a 
non-probation and parole officer cannot obtain the assistance of 
the AP&P officer for the purpose of avoiding the rights to 
privacy which do exist. The Defendant was convicted of all seven 
counts contained in an information against him after a jury 
trial. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing 
counts three through six of the information to remain as separate 
counts where each count alleged the theft of a firearm during the 
course of the came criminal episode and the exact same conduct of 
the Defendant. Finally, the Defendant argues that the evidence 
offered at trial was insufficient to meet the State's burden of 
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty 
of the crimes contained in the information. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 4, 
AND THE STATE OF UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I SECTION 
14 PROHIBIT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES EVEN OF 
PAROLEES. BY ALLOWING OFFICERS, WHETHER PROBATION AND 
PAROLE OR OTHERWISE, TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE AND PREMISE 
WITHOUT A WARRANT, THESE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION WERE 
VIOLATED, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED THE 
EVIDENCE GATHERED DURING THE UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND THE 
VERDICT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED. 
77b^ n Officer Mele first approached Trailer 41 in the Melody 
Esta*: : trailer park, he did not know Roberts, the "Hispanic-
looking male" who exited the residence. He did not know this 
fellow was a parolee. In addition, Officer Mele was not a 
probation and parole officer. This being the case, Roberts 
should have enjoyed the full benefits of the Fourth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution and Section 14 of Article I of the Utah 
State Constitution. Officer Mele should have had probable cause 
that a crime was being committed to engage Roberts longer than 
was reasonably necessary to effect his purpose for the encounter. 
It is confusing to know what exactly the purpose for the 
encounter was and just what crime the law enforcement officers 
thought was being committed by the "three suspicious Hispanics." 
At no time did any officer articulate the probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion of wrong doing. There is no law on the 
books prohibiting the personal sale of a firearm by an 
individual, whether Hispanic or otherwise. Certainly there is no 
evidence or argument that anyone was selling a weapon when 
Officer Mele pulled up. The possession of a firearm in a vehicle 
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is expressly permitted by Section 76-10-510, U.C.A. (1991) as 
amended. The only other issue before the officer when he pulled 
up was that of a report of erratic driving by someone in a 
vehicle matching the description of the vehicle in the driveway 
of Trailer 41. The matter gets a little more confusing in review 
because the officer radioed for back-up. It appears the officer 
was expecting trouble, but the record does not clearly reflect 
why. No officer ever articulated why the show of force was, or 
that it ever became, necessary. Shortly after arriving at 
Trailer 41, there were three law enforcement officers and two 
parole officers. Nevertheless, no probable cause was set forth 
as to why there was a need to search either vehicle or residence 
in this matter, especially without a warrant. 
In any case, such a search would normally require the 
issuance of a warrant. The vehicle was parked in the driveway. 
This was not a traffic stop on the highway attendant with the 
normal exigent circumstances. If the officers wanted to get 
inside the vehicle, they should have obtained a warrant. One 
officer could have easily remained and observed the residence and 
parked vehicle while either of the other two complied with the 
paper trail of the warrant. In fact, the officers took time to 
obtain the keys from the vehicle's owner to open the trunk, but 
didn't even bother to ask permission to search. (Trial 
transcript page 50, lines 11 through 21). Were that the case, it 
might be more apparent what crime they thought was being 
committed. 
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State v. Leonard, (Utah App.) 825 P. 2d 674 (1991) requires 
that the police intrusion be performed by the least intrusive 
manner reasonably possible. Where Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968) and its progeny are not 
applicable, (no moving encounter) a search warrant should issue. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990) the Supreme Court 
held that law enforcement officers were not justified in opening 
the unlocked car door to verify a VIN number. To do so, they 
held, would violate the prohibition against unreasonable 
searches. They indicated that both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances must be present prior to a warrantless intrusion. 
Quoting State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the Court wrote: 
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the 
officers with concealed weapons or will destroy 
evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the 
officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant. 
Such a requirement would present little impediment to 
police investigations, especially in light of the ease 
with which warrants can be obtained under Utah's 
telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 7-23-
4(92) (1982 ed.) 
This language is especially relevant herein. Officer Mele 
immediately radioed for back-up when he pulled into the driveway 
of Trailer 41. (Trial Transcript page 14, lines 10 through 25 and 
page 15, lines 1 through 8). That back-up arrived very quickly. 
The officer could just have easily requested a warrant over the 
radio, in addition to the back-up. The only person in the 
vicinity of the vehicle, who could pose a threat, was Roberts, 
and he was being questioned by Mele. The other two officers were 
available to obtain a warrant if the Officers had probable cause 
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that a crime was being committed. 
The law enforcement officers appeared to justify their lack 
of a warrant on the fact that Roberts was a parolee, (Trial 
Transcript page 18 lines 21 through 24) even through at the time 
of the initial search of the vehicle to obtain the firearms there 
was no knowledge that Roberts was a parolee or that a crime was 
being committed. Nevertheless, while parolees' rights to privacy 
are somewhat restricted, they still have such rights. The law 
has been set forth regarding the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Section of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
State v. Velasquez, 672 P. 2d 1254, (Utah 1983), provides 
significant direction. The Court stated: 
...Thus, although a warrant based on probable cause is 
not generally required, a parole officer must have 
reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee 
has violated the terms of his parole or committed a 
crime. Velasquez, at 1260. 
Additionally, 
. . . Since the rationale of the rule we adopt is that a 
'reasonable search7 rule is a condition of parole 
necessary to the operation of the parole system, it 
follows that the rule applies regardless of the 
language of the parole agreement. The term "reasonable 
grounds" does not mean that which would be necessary 
for probable cause. Rather, it means a reasonable 
suspicion that a parolee has committed a parole 
violation or crime....The search, however, must be 
reasonably related to the parole officer's duty. People 
v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 
794 (1977); State v. Sims, supra, 10 Wash.App. at 88, 
516 P.2d at 1096. Velasquez, at 1260. 
The Velasquez court also cited State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 
227, 657 P.2d 1095, 1101 (App.1983), quoting State v. Sims, 10 
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Wash.App. 75, 88, 516 P.2d 1099, 1096 (1973), stating: 
For searches conducted by parole officers pursuant 
to the reasonable suspicion standard, '(a) search 
cannot be based upon a mere hunch without factual 
basis, nor upon 'casual rumor, general reputation, or 
mere whim.' 
Notwithstanding any provision of any parole agreement, the 
reasonable search rule is applicable. In order to perform any 
search of a parole, the parole officer must have reasonable 
suspicion that the parole has committed a parole violation or 
crime. Thus, the reasonable suspicion rule is applicable herein. 
Perhaps the probation and parole officers would have had 
reasonable suspicion to initially search the vehicle, however, if 
Roberts had stated to them he was driving the vehicle, as he 
purportedly did to Officer Mele, the AP&P officers might have 
observed the weapons, and they could have arrested Roberts for a 
parole violation. As it happened, the law enforcement officers 
had already conducted an unreasonable search of the vehicle and 
obtained the weapons. The harm had already been done to the 
investigation and everything from that point out became fruit of 
an illegal search. Had Officer Mele waited, and informed Adult 
Probation and Parole personnel he had a parolee, admitting to 
driving a vehicle with weapons inside, there might have been 
reasonable suspicion to open the vehicle and obtain the weapons. 
In this matter, there were three searches performed. The 
first was when the officer checked the firearms in the vehicle. 
The next was the search of the residence and the third was the 
lengthy and comprehensive search of the subject vehicle again. 
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In all three searches, there was never a warrant sought. After 
the law enforcement officers searched the vehicle they should 
have satisfied themselves that there was no further crime being 
committed, or at the very least, that there were no further 
justifications for a warrantless search. Roberts, by then known 
to be a parolee, had been arrested, although arguably illegally. 
The weapons had been run through NCIC and III and had shown 
clear. Roberts had also admitted to driving the vehicle. All 
purposes for which the police officers had converged on the 
residence were then satisfied. The officers could only act on 
the information they had at any given time. State v, Baird, 763 
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988). The guns were not stolen and the 
reckless driver had been arrested. The law enforcement officers 
had no other valid suspicions. The police encounter should have 
ended there. If the officers had further concerns about any of 
the property, a warrant should have been obtained. Because they 
failed to obtain a warrant, when no exigent circumstances 
existed, whether they had additional probable cause or even 
reasonable suspicion or not, the subsequent searches, and all 
they revealed, including the burglarized residence in Sunnyside, 
should have been suppressed. They officers knew the owner of the 
residence and knew he did not fit the description of the 
occupants of the vehicle. There was no reasonable suspicion of 
him and thus, no reason to enter his residence. 
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II. THE USE OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICERS TO 
PERFORM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES WAS DONE WITH THE EXPRESS 
INTENT OF CIRCUMVENTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 
SECTION FOURTEEN PRIVACY RIGHTS. THEREFORE, ANY 
EVIDENCE GATHERED PURSUANT TO SUCH ARREST SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
While parolees have lesser rights of privacy than ordinary 
citizens, they nevertheless have privacy rights. It is accepted 
that the probation and parole officers have powers relating 
specifically to parolees which are distinct from other law 
enforcement officers. However, these powers are still subject to 
those rights of privacy existing in parolees. It is very clear 
that law enforcement officers cannot use the distinct authorities 
of probation officers for the purpose of circumventing warrant 
requirements. United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452 (9th 
Cir.1976), quoted in State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987). 
The Johnson court stated, "...we have warned that police officers 
may not use parole officers simply as a means of avoiding the 
warrant requirements to conduct random searches..." The Court 
also stated that while a parole officer's search is not unlawful 
just because it is also beneficial to the police, "...That does 
not, however, sanction unlimited complicity between parole 
officers and police." Johnson at 1072. 
In this matter, as has been set forth, all legitimate 
concerns expressed by the police in their ATL and arrest of 
Roberts had been addressed. While they had already erred by 
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extracting the rifles from the vehicle without a warrant, even 
they recognized the need for a warrant to proceed further. 
Nevertheless, they turned to the AP&P officers to do something 
they could not do themselves. The police officers must have 
known they were against a wall as far as continuing any police 
encounter. They turned to the AP&P officers. However, the AP&P 
officers were at the same point. Roberts was the only person 
known to AP&P as being under their auspices, who had done 
anything wrong. He was already under arrest. While they stated 
at trial that the owner of the trailer, Teddy Kinneman, was a 
parolee, he did not fit the description of one of the three 
persons in the vehicle, nor was he present. There was no other 
probable causes or reasonable suspicion of a crime being 
committed, or of a parole being violated, once Roberts was 
arrested. 
III. COUNTS THREE (3) THROUGH SIX (6) WERE 
IDENTICAL AND INVOLVED THE SAME CONDUCT AND SAME 
ELEMENTS. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED COUNTS 
FOUR (4), FIVE (5) AND SIX (6) AS BEING REPETITIVE AND 
CONTRARY TO SECTION 76-6-412 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
(1953), AS AMENDED. 
Section 76-6-412, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as 
amended, deals with theft, categorizing the various offenses, 
some as to value, others as to the nature of the property. The 
language states in applicable part, "Theft of property and 
services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as a 
felony of the second degree if the property stolen is a firearm. 
In the case at hand a part of the property alleged stolen was 
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firearms. The question becomes, because there was more than one 
firearm alleged stolen in the self same incident, would there be 
more than one charge or count? Section 76-1-402 et seq., U.C.A. 
(1953) as amended, provides "...when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of 
this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision..." Section 401 provides that a single criminal 
episode means "all conduct which is closely related in time and 
is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective. In State v. Thompson, 571 P. 2d 805 (Utah 
App. 1988), the Court of Appeals, discussing whether a bribe was 
one bribe or several separate bribes said "...the existence of a 
single offense or multiple offenses is a question of intent to be 
determined by the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case." State v. Kimball, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980), quoted 
in Thompson, adds, "...If there is but one intent, one general 
impulse, and one plan, even through there is a series of 
transactions, there is but one offense." In this matter there 
was clearly only one plan. As alleged, the burglary took place 
at one time, all the items from the burglary were removed at the 
same time. Even though there were more than one firearm, it was 
one transaction, one plan and one impulse. The state, by 
charging the balance of the property in one general count of 
theft, bears this out. Otherwise, each item taken would have 
been charged as a separate offense. The firearms would be a 
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separate count because the theft of firearms, as an item or type 
of property, have been established to be a more severe crime than 
for instance the theft of CD tapes (or cupcakes, as the Court 
reasoned; trial transcript, page 101, lines 10 through 12.) 
However, there should have been charged only one more severe 
crime of theft and one lesser crime of theft, 
IV. THE EVIDENCE, ALONG WITH ALL RATIONAL 
INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM, OF THE THEFT OF FIREARMS 
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF THE 
DEFENDANT BY THE JURY. 
State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 443 (Utah 1983) requires "...the 
fabric of the evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt." 
Petree at 444. The evidence against the Defendant regarding the 
firearms is merely the single fingerprint on the jewelry box. 
While interesting, the single fingerprint should not be 
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. There was no other 
direct evidence against the Defendant. His presence at the 
Trailer No. 41 was used by the State initially to arrest him for 
trespass, as he supposedly had no right to be there. 
Eyewitnesses couldn't identify Defendant with much accuracy or 
assurance. Continuing in Petree, at 444, the court said "...But 
this does not mean that the court can take a speculative leap 
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The 
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State in 
re J.S.H., 642 P.2d 386 (Utah 1982); State v. Kourbelas, 621 
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P.2d 1238, 1240 (1980). 
There was no physical evidence linking the Defendant to the 
firearms, as was admitted several times during the course of the 
trial. No fingerprints were even attempted to be lifted off the 
firearms. There were no accounts of seeing the defendant in the 
proximity of the weapons at any point in time. The trial court 
should have taken great pains to avoid allowing the jury to allow 
a rational inference to become a presumption of guilt. Rational 
inference should only add to the proof, not replace the burden of 
proof. 
CONCLUSION 
In the first instance, all of the evidence gathered by law 
enforcement personnel and parole officers should have been 
suppressed by the trial court below. The officers proceeded to 
search without probable cause and without exigent circumstances, 
and without a warrant. The trial court erred in allowing the 
evidence to remain without making such a finding that exigent 
circumstances, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion existed in 
the situation or the minds of the officers present. The trial 
court should also have found that the parole officers were merely 
tools of the law enforcement officers in this occasion, there 
being too much complicity between them. The trial court erred 
when it allowed four separate theft of firearm counts to remain 
pending against the Defendant, when there existed one general 
criminal episode, one impulse, and one plan. Finally, the 
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evidence introduced at the trial was insufficient to sustain the 
burden of the State to convict the Defendant of the thefts of the 
firearms beyond a reasonable doubt. 
DATED this day of October, 1994. 
David M. Allred 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the day of October, 1994, I sent to 
Jan Graham, UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Utah State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, four true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing instrument, by depositing same 
in the U.S. Mail, postage fully prepaid. 
10/11/94 DMA51601 
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GEORGE M. HARMOND, JR. #1375 
Deputy County Attorney 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA 
230 N 400 W 
Price, UT 84501 
DOB: 7/1/51 
MATTHEW THOMAS ROBERTS 
230 N 400 W 
Price, UT 84501 
DOB: 8/15/71 
Defendant(s) 
INFORMATION 
126-3-94 
Criminal No. S^LLWUB-ES 
Criminal No. <3-MJ^nn^n P^r 
Judge "-HfJili/K fr 
COMES NOV/, Carbon County Attorney and states on information and belief 
that the above-named defendant(s) committed the following crime(s): 
DATE J On or about March 23, 1994 
PLACE: Carbon County, State of Utah 
COUNT Ii BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of 
Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, unlawfully entered the dwelling of 
another with the intent to commit a theft, to-wit: house belonging to VELOY 
SORENSONj 
COUNT II: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at 
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over 
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: 
Remington Model 700, .243 cal. rifle; 
COUNT III: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at 
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over 
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: 
Winchester Model 70, .270 cal. rifle? 
21 
COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
r.npv 
INFORMATION 
PAGE 2 
126-3-94 
COUNT TVt THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at 
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over 
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: 
Mauser .243 cal. rifle; 
COUNT Vt THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at 
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over 
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: 
Savage .22 cal. rifle; 
COUNT VIt THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and 
place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property 
of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: binoculars, 
bullets, clothing valued at more than $100.00 but less than $250.00; 
COUNT VII: POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY ^ P A R O L E E ] a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Section 76-10-503 (2) (a), Ufeah-Gede Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
in that the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, jghile opparole 
from the Utah State Prison, did have in his possession, or under his custody or 
control a firearm; 
contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute, and against the peace and 
dignity of the State of Utah. 
THIS INFORMATION is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: Robert Setzer/644140 & 644135 & 940161 
DATED this 22L day of March, 1994. 
yHARMOND, JR. * 
GEORGE/mew/3/28/94 
*GE M HARMO JR. 
Deputy County Attorney 
2? 
David M. Allred, #6463 
Attorney for Defendant 
Post Office Box 575 
26 East Main Street 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
(801) 381-5326 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA 
Defendant. 
> MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
1 MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING 
I CRIMINAL NO. 941700140 FS 
i Judge Bruce Halliday 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, David M. 
Allred, and respectfully moves this court for an Order: 
1. Suppressing ail pre-Maranda statements made by the 
Defendant to police officer Kevin Mele and or any other law 
enforcement officer on or about March 23, 1994, at Melody esteres 
Trailer Court, Price, Utah or elsewhere, in violation of 
Defendant's constitutional rights including Amendment V of the 
Untied States Constitution aid Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution; and also suppressing all evidence obtained as "fruit" 
of the Defendant's statements or any evidence obtained from those 
statements; and 
2. Suppressing all evidence seized on or about March 23, 
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1994, from the searches of the automobile described in the police 
reports in this case as a 1976 Ford Torino, brown in color, Utah 
license plate 581 FAB, including but not limited to the firearms, 
binoculars, and briefcase and its contents, as unreasonable 
warrantless searches and seizures in violation of the Defedant's 
Constitution rights including Amendment IV of the Untied States 
Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
This motion is made pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure Rule 12. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of June, 1994 
David M. Allred 
Attorney for the Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO GEORGE M. HARMOND, DEPUTY CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY: 
Notice is hereby given that Defendants Motion to Suppress wilj^ 
come on regularly for hearing before the above Court on the r^jf — 
day of July, 1994 at 3*'€C4/y or as soon thereafter as counsel cqn 
be heard. 
Dated this ^- / day of June^l994 
David M. Allred 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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GEORGE M. HARMOND, JR. #1375 
Deputy County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant. 
i JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
I TO STATE PRISON 
i Criminal No. 941700139 FS 
The above-named defendant appeared on July 29, 1994, together with his 
attorney of record, DAVID M. ALLRED, for Jury Trial, and having been found 
guilty of the charge(s) of COUNT Is BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second Degree 
Felony? COUNT II: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony? COUNT III: 
THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony; COUNT IV: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a 
Second Degree Felony; COUNT V: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony? 
COUNT VI: THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor? COUNT VII: POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 
BY A PAROLEE, a Second Degree Felony, and having advised the Court that he 
had no legal reason to state why judgment should not be pronounced, and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises? 
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said AMORICO RAMON 
ARCHULETTA serve a term in the Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen (15) 
years on Count I? and one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Counts II, III, IV, V 
for each count and to run concurrently with each other but consecutively with 
Count I? and one (1) year on Count VI to run concurrently with Count I? and 
one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Count VII to run consecutively with II, III, 
IV, V? 
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You, the said AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA, are hereby rendered into the 
custody of the Sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, to be by him delivered 
into the custody of thgJftarden, or other proper officer of said State Prison. 
DATED this //} day of August, 1994. 
BY THE CO 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:  
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